Asymmetric Encryption: Public and Private Key Systems
Asymmetric encryption is the cryptographic foundation underlying secure internet communications, digital identity verification, and authenticated data exchange across public networks. Unlike symmetric encryption, asymmetric systems use mathematically linked key pairs — one public, one private — eliminating the need to share secret keys over potentially compromised channels. This page describes how those systems are structured, the dominant algorithms in active use, the regulatory and compliance contexts that mandate their application, and the operational boundaries that govern algorithm selection.
Definition and scope
Asymmetric encryption, also called public-key cryptography, is a class of cryptographic system in which two distinct but mathematically related keys perform complementary functions: one key encrypts or verifies, and the other decrypts or signs. The public key can be distributed freely; the private key remains secret to its owner. A message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted by the corresponding private key, and a digital signature generated with the private key can only be verified by the corresponding public key.
NIST SP 800-175B Rev. 1, Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the Federal Government: Cryptographic Mechanisms, formally defines public-key cryptography and specifies approved algorithms for federal use. The three principal families of asymmetric algorithms in active federal and commercial deployment are:
- RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman): Based on the computational difficulty of factoring large integers. Key sizes of 2048 bits are the current minimum for federal applications per NIST guidance; 3072-bit and 4096-bit keys extend security margins further. See the RSA encryption reference for detailed parameter guidance.
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC): Based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. A 256-bit ECC key provides security comparable to a 3072-bit RSA key (NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5, Table 2). See elliptic curve cryptography for algorithm-level detail.
- Diffie–Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH): Key agreement protocols, not encryption algorithms per se — used to establish shared symmetric session keys without transmitting them. ECDH is the dominant variant in modern TLS/SSL implementations.
NIST's post-quantum standardization effort, formalized through FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205 (published August 2024), introduces lattice-based and hash-based algorithms — CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+ — to replace RSA and ECC in contexts where quantum computing poses a credible threat. The transition timeline and scope are described in post-quantum cryptography.
How it works
The operational mechanics of asymmetric encryption follow a defined sequence regardless of the underlying algorithm family:
- Key generation: A key pair is generated using a cryptographically secure random number generator. The private key is derived first; the public key is computed from it through a one-way mathematical function. The security of the system depends on the computational infeasibility of reversing this function.
- Public key distribution: The public key is shared through a trusted channel — typically a digital certificate issued by a certificate authority operating within a public key infrastructure (PKI).
- Encryption (confidentiality use case): A sender retrieves the recipient's public key, uses it to encrypt the plaintext, and transmits the ciphertext. Only the holder of the corresponding private key can decrypt.
- Decryption: The recipient applies the private key to the ciphertext, recovering the original plaintext. The private key never leaves the recipient's secure environment.
- Digital signing (authentication use case): The signer applies the private key to a hash of the message, producing a signature. Any party with the public key can verify authenticity and integrity by recomputing the hash and checking the signature. See digital signatures reference for the full signing workflow.
- Key exchange: In protocols like TLS 1.3, asymmetric operations are used exclusively to authenticate parties and negotiate a session key; bulk data encryption is then performed symmetrically using AES for performance reasons.
Asymmetric operations are computationally expensive relative to symmetric operations. RSA encryption of a 256-byte payload is orders of magnitude slower than AES-256 encryption of the same payload on equivalent hardware, which is why hybrid approaches — asymmetric for key exchange, symmetric for data — dominate production deployments.
Common scenarios
Asymmetric encryption appears across distinct operational contexts, each with its own standards requirements:
- HTTPS/TLS: TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) mandates forward secrecy via ECDHE key exchange, using ECC to negotiate session keys. Older RSA key exchange modes were deprecated. The TLS/SSL encryption protocols page covers cipher suite selection in detail.
- Email encryption: S/MIME and OpenPGP both use asymmetric key pairs for sender authentication and message encryption. Email encryption standards covers the two protocol families comparatively.
- Code signing: Software publishers sign binaries with their private key; operating systems verify signatures before execution using the public key. Code signing certificates describes the certificate issuance chain.
- Federal PIV credentials: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards issued under FIPS 201-3 embed RSA-2048 or ECC P-256 private keys on tamper-resistant hardware for federal employee authentication.
- VPN authentication: IKEv2, used in IPsec-based VPN configurations, relies on RSA or ECDSA certificates for peer authentication before establishing encrypted tunnels. See VPN encryption protocols.
- Encrypted DNS: DoH (DNS over HTTPS) and DoT (DNS over TLS) both depend on TLS certificate infrastructure and asymmetric key exchange. Encrypted DNS covers the transport security model.
Decision boundaries
Selecting the appropriate asymmetric system requires matching algorithm characteristics to operational constraints, threat models, and compliance obligations.
RSA vs. ECC: RSA remains widely supported across legacy systems and is often required for interoperability with older hardware security modules. ECC offers equivalent security at shorter key lengths, reducing computational overhead — relevant for constrained environments such as IoT devices and mobile platforms. For new deployments without legacy constraints, NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5 recommends ECC over RSA due to the security-per-bit advantage.
Key length minimums by compliance regime:
- FIPS 140-3 (NIST FIPS 140-3) mandates RSA keys of at least 2048 bits or ECC keys of at least 224 bits for approved operation in federal systems.
- PCI DSS v4.0 (PCI Security Standards Council) requires "strong cryptography" and references NIST guidance for key length minimums — effectively aligning with the 2048-bit RSA floor.
- HIPAA does not specify key lengths by statute but requires "addressable" encryption safeguards; HHS guidance directs covered entities toward NIST standards, making FIPS alignment the practical benchmark.
Quantum readiness: RSA and ECC are both vulnerable to Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently capable quantum computer. Organizations under long-data-retention mandates — healthcare records, classified archives — face "harvest now, decrypt later" exposure even before quantum hardware matures. NIST's post-quantum algorithm standards (FIPS 203–205) define the migration path. Quantum threats to encryption quantifies the threat timeline as understood by the cryptographic research community.
Private key storage: The security model of asymmetric encryption collapses if the private key is compromised. Hardware security modules and secure enclaves are the accepted mitigation for production private key storage, with FIPS 140-3 Level 3 or higher validation required in high-assurance federal deployments. Encryption key management covers the lifecycle governance framework.
References
- NIST SP 800-175B Rev. 1 — Guideline for Using Cryptographic Standards in the Federal Government
- NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5 — Recommendation for Key Management
- NIST FIPS 140-3 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
- NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization — FIPS 203, 204, 205
- NIST FIPS 201-3 — Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors
- [IETF RFC 8446 — The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/